Category Archives: Arctic

Canadian Coast Guard (also) Undermanned and Underfunded

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980914-N-8492C-005 PEGGYÕS COVE, Nova Scotia (Sept. 14, 1998) Ð- Canadian Coast Guard Cutter CCGV Hudson (front) conducts Laser Line Scanning (LLS) operations with the lasted in US Navy developed high-tech equipment at the crash site of SwissAir Flight 111. US Navy photo by PhotographerÕs Mate 1st Class Todd P. Cichonowicz. (RELEASED)

980914-N-8492C-005
PEGGYÕS COVE, Nova Scotia (Sept. 14, 1998) Ð- Canadian Coast Guard Cutter CCGV Hudson (front) now the oldest major vessel in the Canadian Coast Guard, conducts Laser Line Scanning (LLS) operations with the latest in US Navy developed high-tech equipment at the crash site of SwissAir Flight 111. US Navy photo by PhotographerÕs Mate 1st Class Todd P. Cichonowicz. (RELEASED)

Professional Mariner has reported that a Transport Canada report found the Canadian Coast Guard ” …fleet is undermanned and desperately in need of new ships” and “that unplanned maintenance on aging Coast Guard vessels skyrocketed in 2014.”

My first reaction was of course that they have the same problems we do, but looking at the history of Canadian Coast Guard ship building it is apparent that while none of their ships are over 53 years old, with those built in the 80s the largest group, so maybe they are slightly better off. On the other hand, there was almost no large ship construction in the 1990s or later so they are facing block obsolescence.

I took a look at the documents. I have to admit, I did not read them all. They cover all modes and aspects of transportation. Volume One (pdf) is the basic report and it is 286 pages, and Volume Two (pdf) is the Appendices and it is 230 pages. However, I did use the search function to find every mention of Coast Guard and there were some interesting aspects.

For one thing, the Canadian Coast Guard is partially funded by user fees. The report then goes on to both complain that the user fees have not been raised since established and consequently have not kept up with rising demand and costs, and then also points out that user fees tend to make Canada less competitive. There is not a clear recommendation on this point.

“The government introduced user fees to recover part of the costs for navigation services, which have not changed since 1998. Approximately 15 to 30 percent of the Canadian Coast Guard’s operating costs ($27 million out of $190 million) are recovered from industry (see Figures 9 and 10); icebreaking fees are separate.”

They have a strong justification for the Coast Guard in claiming its inadequacies hurt Canada’s economic competitivenes.

“The underfunding of the Coast Guard seriously hampers its ability to discharge its mandate, which adversely affects Canada’s international competitiveness and trade. (p.13)”

The report finds that the Canadian Coast Guard’s lack of law enforcement authority (and implicitly weapons to back up that authority) results in inefficiencies.

“The Canadian Coast Guard As noted above, the Canadian Coast Guard is responsible for the safe and efficient movement of ships in Canadian coastal and inland waters. Canada is unusual in having a civilian coast guard. In other northern jurisdictions, such as Denmark, Greenland, Norway, Iceland, Finland, and Russia, and in the United States, the coast guard is a military or security organization. As a civilian body, the Canadian Coast Guard does not have the authority to enforce international and national laws and regulations pertaining to the sea, the environment, and sovereignty without RCMP officers present, even though Canadian Coast Guard vessels and staff may be the best placed to respond to critical events and detect illegal activity. This has resulted in an inefficient enforcement regime. Canada has also been slow to use maritime transport to promote development and strengthen sovereignty. Canada must ensure that it meets the challenges of increased maritime traffic in the Arctic, the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, the Seaway, the Pacific and the Atlantic. Because of existing governance arrangements and inadequate funding, the Canadian Coast Guard is not currently well equipped to do so.” (p.220)

The report found that current ship building plans including the requirement to buy Canadian would not addressing the problem of an aging fleet.

“As noted above and as depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3, the Canadian Coast Guard fleet is aging, which has implications for maintenance as well as procurement. Given that 29 percent of the large vessels are more than 35 years old and close to 60 percent of small vessels are older than the design life of 20 years, it is not surprising that the number of major systems repairs required is increasing, vessel days are decreasing, and the number of ships out of service is increasing over time. The decrease in 2009 was as a result of money dedicated for repairs paid by the Economic Action Plan. Indeed, for such a critical piece of transportation infrastructure, the Canadian Coast Guard is not receiving the political attention, or the administrative and financial resources it requires. In 2014, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development found that the Canadian Coast Guard’s icebreaking presence in the Arctic is decreasing, while vessel traffic is increasing.26 In response, the Canadian Coast Guard, Transport Canada, and the Canadian Hydrographic Service are currently advancing the Northern Marine Transportation Corridors Initiative to support responsible marine development, enhance marine navigation safety, and guide future Arctic investments.27 In addition, the 2015 Report of the Independent Review of the M/V Marathassa Fuel Oil Spill Environmental Response Operation found that the Canadian Coast Guard lacked adequate staff to respond in any part of its region at any time.28 Not only is it understaffed, but its fleet is one of the oldest in the world and urgently requires renewal (individual ships average nearly 34 years of age).29 Without such renewal it will have to pull ships from service, further reducing reliability. However, under the National Shipbuilding and Procurement Strategy, which requires the Canadian Coast Guard to purchase ships from Canadian shipyards, it can only replace one ship a year, at most. At that rate, the median age of the fleet will not decrease. Other strategies, such as outsourcing or leasing, are not part of the strategy and thus cannot be deployed to meet short-term requirements. (p.221)

There may be beaurocratic power grab here, in that Transport Canada seems to want the Canadian Coast Guard transferred under it purview rather than the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. In fact the Canadian Coast Guard had been an agency of the Department of Transportation until 1994 when it was moved to Fisheries and Oceans.

“We have been concerned for some time that the separate and distinctive roles of Transport Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard [make for] a less than efficient model for a coordinated and timely response to a maritime emergency. The situation is further compounded by CCG having been placed under the administration of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans whose role has little in common with that of CCG.” “p.231)

The Canadian Coast Guard is organizationally a mid-point between the single agency multiple tasked broad authority USCG model and the multiple specialized agencies UK model. In some respects it also incorporates elements that would correspond to duties performed in the US by NOAA and National Marine Fisheries. Apparently it, like the USCG has had a problem fitting in any one department because of its multiple missions. While it is under the Department of Fish and Oceans, since 2005 it has been designated a “special operating agency” with greater autonomy.

Notably the prevailing Canadian attitude seems to be that, if anything, the CCG needs to be given weapons and law enforcement authority, bringing it closer to the USCG model, so perhaps it is an endorsement of sorts, for the way the USCG is structured.

Perhaps the USCG needs to be a “special operating agency” or “independent agency” as it is called in the US, as well; after all, there are already 27 (or more) of them, but that is a topic for another day.

Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.

Cruise Ship in the Arctic Raises SAR Fears

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NorthWestPassageCruise

CBCNews reports that a cruise ship with a crew of 600 and an expected 1000 passengers is planning to make a cruise from Anchorage to New York City via the North West Passage, August 16 to September 17, 2016, and it is raising the specter of a mass casualty event far from any rescue assets.

I think the Russians require an escort for passage through the Northern Sea Route, for which they charge a fee.

“Plus, introducing our brand new Crystal Unexpected Adventures—your chance to explore this magnificent region on truly spontaneous excursions! This is the ultimate expedition for the true explorer!”

“Adventures make one late for dinner.”–Bilbo Baggins.

Thanks to Ken for bringing this to my attention.

9th NSC as D17 Flagship–CIMSEC

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The Coast Guard Cutter Stratton from Alameda, Calif., steams near an ice floe in the Arctic Ocean during Operation Arctic Shield 2014 Sept. 14, 2014. (Coast Guard photo courtesy of Cutter Statton)

CIMSEC has a post, “DESIGNATE THE 9TH NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER AN ARCTIC FLAGSHIP,” which suggest essentially two related actions regarding the recently funded ninth Bertholf class National Security Cutter (NSC).

  • Homeport it in Kodiak, and
  • Ice-strengthen the hull.

As usual, the benefits of cutting transit time by basing ships in Kodiak are overstated because the need to transit south for training and yard period is neglected. Individual training is also easier and less expensive if the ship is located near training facilities.

I find the case for ice strengthening a bit more interesting, but do we really want to redesign a ship that now benefits from the maturity of its design?

The author also touts the advantages of light icebreaking done by an ice-strengthened NSC, perhaps not realizing that icebreaking is already done by 225 foot buoy tenders, four of which are homeported in Alaska, including one in Kodiak.

It really looks like the OPC would be a better choice for homeporting in Alaska, being simpler and already planned to be ice-strengthened, but it is also true that the ninth NSC will be finished at least a couple of years before the first OPC and probably several years before an OPC will be homeported in Kodiak.

Document Alert: Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress

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ice-breakers-540688_1280

The Congressional Research Service has issued another study, this one on the Arctic (pdf). It was authored by their Naval Expert Ronald O’Rourke, who has authored several reports on the Coast Guard, so you can be sure he has an understanding of the Coast Guard’s situation.

It is pretty long, but here is the summary.

“The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. On January 21, 2015, President Obama issued an executive order for enhancing coordination of national efforts in the Arctic. The United States assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council on April 24, 2015, and will serve in that capacity for two years.

“Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security.

“The five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory)—have made or are in the process of preparing submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding the outer limits of their extended continental shelves. The Russian submission includes the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, a feature that spans a considerable distance across the Arctic Ocean.

“The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Current international guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters are being updated.

“Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies have yet to be developed.

“Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect threatened and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies, health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples.

“Two of the Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Sea is not operational. On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council signed an agreement on cooperation on search and rescue in the Arctic.

“Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. Some of the Arctic coastal states, particularly Russia, have announced an intention or taken actions to enhance their military presences in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard, have begun to pay more attention to the region in their planning and operations.”

Thoughts on State of the CG, 2016

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You can read the Commandant’s State of the Coast Guard speech here (pdf). It is only eight pages.

The Commandant continues to hammer on themes he has addressed in the past–the Arctic Strategy in response to the opening of a new ocean and the Western Hemisphere Strategy in response to lawlessness in Central America and the resulting immigration crisis (plus the ships needed to employment the strategies–OPCs and Icebreakers in particular), and duty to our people (the Human Capital Strategy). While the topics are familiar, his tone is more optimistic.

The Coast Guard budget for FY2016 included the largest acquisitions, construction, and improvements (AC&I) budget in its history and the Commandant appears to believe this will not be a flute.

The Commandant has chosen his battles and is doing well in terms of conveying what he sees as the critical narrative. Now it sounds like he is about to expand his objectives.

The Commandant has promised an analysis of Coast Guard personnel requirements.

Most people have seen the great American cinema classic Jaws. In it, Police Chief Brody, when he first lays eyes on the 30-foot Great White shark attacking New England beachgoers, says to his colleague, “You’re going to need a bigger boat.” It is a great line that lives on as an expression to state the obvious.
We’ll let me nuance that a bit. Looking at the challenges we’re facing in the world today: ladies and gentlemen, you’re going to need a bigger Coast Guard….As required by our 2015 Authorization Act, I am directing a Coast Guard Manpower Requirements Plan to formally establish a force size informed by strategy, analysis and risk management.

Allow me to look even further down the road,

The world seems to becoming an increasingly dangerous place. The brief window when the US ruled a mono-polar world is closed. It may be time for the Coast Guard to reemphasize its military character. If you look at long term trends, the size of the Coast Guard, in terms of personnel has generally been stable or growing, while the still much larger, Navy has continued to shrink. When I was commissioned in 1969, the Navy was about 21 times larger than the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps was over eight times as large. Now the Navy is less than eight times the size of the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps is less than five times as large. In terms of personnel the Coast Guard is already larger than the British or French Navy. This suggest that its potential as a significant naval force should not be ignored. 

The Coast Guard now seems poised to have a future fleet of nine frigate sized National Security Cutters and 25 corvette (or light frigate) sized Offshore Patrol Cutters. That is 34 surface combatants, not an insignificant number when you consider the Navy has and will have only about 120 cruisers, destroyers frigates and LCS. While the cutters quality as warships is far below that of DDG, they are not far removed from that of an LCS and in some respects, particularly endurance, they are superior. We really need to look at what we could do, for relatively small marginal costs, to make these ships effective contributions to the National Fleet. In a similar fashion we need to look at how other elements of the Coast Guard could strengthen national defense.

The Coast Guard may be the US’s secret naval edge, unrecognized by our enemies and by our own government, the Navy and many of our own people, but risking the stealthy nature of our contribution to national defense, a more formalized and recognized military tasking could justify continued expansion that could also improve performance in other mission areas, and give us the bigger Coast Guard the Commandant think we need.

 

Document Alert: World Wide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, 2/9/16

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We have a statement for the record (pdf) from James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, dated February 9, 2016. Perhaps it is the nature of the beast, but there is no good news, and much that is bad.

Smuggling of every type appears to be on the rise including drugs and people. We can expect an increase in illegal immigration as a result of violence, poverty, and disorder in Latin America and particularly Cuba and Central America.

It is a relatively compact document. There are sections on Terrorism (pp 4-6), transnational organized crime (pp 11-12), Arctic (p 13), Environmental Risks and Climate Change (pp 13-14), health (including potential pandemics) (pp 14-15), and Global Displacement, “These 60 million consist of approximately 20 million refugees, 38 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and approximately 2 million stateless persons, also according to UNHCR statistics.” (p.15)

There are also regional assessments including one on Latin America and the Caribbean (pp 28-29).

There is no regional assessment for the US. In terms of direct terrorist threats to the US, while there is a recognition of an aspiration on the part of various groups to attack the US, but the emphasis seems to be on “homegrown violent extremists” (HVEs) and there is nothing about the possibility of a maritime attack on the US. Is that because none exist?

Early Icebreaker Specs

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USCGC Polar Sea

USCGC Polar Sea

FedBizOpps.gov has published  a draft document that gives us a first look at possible specs for the proposed polar icebreaker,

Polar_Icebreaker_Replacement_Draft_Data_Package_13_J…(913.98 Kb)

This is different from what we saw on FedBizOpps only a few days ago.

There is a notional Polar Icebreaker Acquisition Schedule that anticipates contract award between Q4 FY 2018 and Q4 FY2019.

Some of the provisions/characteristics I found interesting were:

  • Sustained Speed, 15 knots.
  • Minimum range of 21,500 nautical miles at 12 kts
  • Capable of independently breaking though ice with a thickness ≥ 6 ft (threshold) / ≥ 8 ft (objective) at a continuous speed ≥ 3 kts.
  • Capable of independently breaking through ridged ice with a thickness of 21 ft.
  • Capable of breaking a single-pass channel to a width of at least 83 ft.
  • Three 9 ft x 35 ft buoys including associated buoy mooring equipment.
  • Six twenty foot equivalent units (TEU) with a maximum weight of 20 tons each.
  • Capable of underway replenishment.
  • Weapons limited to four .50 cal. and boarding party weapons.
  • Aviation facilities include hangaring two H-60s with blades folded.
  • Air-search radar.
  • Capacity to tow astern a vessel not exceeding an equivalent displacement to that of the PIB (Polar Icebreaker) (Not an overly ambitious spec,why don’t we just say 20,000 tons or specify bollard pull?–Chuck)

Again we have Bryant’s Maritime Consulting to thank for the link.

Icebreaker Requirements Published

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USCGC Polar Sea

USCGC Polar Sea

BreakingDefense.com has reported the Commandant has announced the release of  “a notional program schedule [and] notional Polar Icebreaker requirements” for two new heavy icebreakers today.

Details have been released to qualified contractors, but not the general public.

The reference to two icebreakers is a bit of a surprise. The source of the funding is not clear, but the Commandant suggest there is strong support in Congress and he sees some of it coming in 2017.

UPDATE: The additional details on the requirements from DefenseNews.

Specifically, the new ships need to be able to continuously push through up to six feet of ice — but preferably eight — going at least 3 knots.

In ice-free waters, it will need a sustained speed of 15 knots, or the speed at max horsepower.

The new icebreakers must also be able to:

  • Sail a range of 21,500 nautical miles at 12 knots.
  • Go 80 days underway without replenishment.
  • Run at least 3,300 operational hours a year.
  • Visually evaluate ice conditions for 12 nautical miles in each direction.
  • Land a range of military and federal helicopters.
  • Hangar two Coast Guard helicopters or future unmanned systems.

 

The Navy’s New Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority–CNO

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Download the pdf here.

Recently the new Chief of Naval Operations has issued a document , “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” that outlines how, hopefully, the US Navy can maintain a maritime superiority our foes will recognize and avoid confronting.

If you are looking for anything specifically regarding the Coast Guard here, you will not find it (other than the cutter in the formation on the cover). The Coast Guard is not mentioned even once, but it does talk about some things that are Coast Guard related. Perhaps we should not feel bad about this. It only mentions the Marine Corps once.

He talks about three forces that are changing the environment: 

  • The first global force is the traffic on the oceans, seas, and waterways, including the sea floor – the classic maritime system.
  • A second increasingly influential force is the rise of the global information system – the information that rides on the servers, undersea cables, satellites, and wireless networks that increasingly envelop and connect the globe.
  • The third interrelated force is the increasing rate of technological creation and adoption.”

Obviously the Coast Guard facilitates and regulates marine traffic and is tapped into the global information system. In wartime, these contacts will become essential. He also talks about new trade routes opening in the Arctic, that will only be reliable if we have new icebreakers. He also talks about illegal trafficing.

“This maritime traffic also includes mass and uncontrolled migration and illicit shipment of material and people.”

For once, finally, a document explicitly recognizes the competition,

“For the first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to great power competition. Russia and China both have advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers. Their goals are backed by a growing arsenal of high-end warfighting capabilities, many of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly designed from the ground up to leverage the maritime, technological and information systems. They continue to develop and field information-enabled weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic, with increasing range, precision and destructive capacity. Both China and Russia are also engaging in coercion and competition below the traditional thresholds of high-end conflict, but nonetheless exploit the weakness of accepted norms in space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost two decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world.

“…Coupled with a continued dedication to furthering its nuclear weapons and missile programs, North Korea’s provocative actions continue to threaten security in North Asia and beyond.

“…while the recent international agreement with Iran is intended to curb its nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s advanced missiles, proxy forces and other conventional capabilities continue to pose threats to which the Navy must remain prepared to respond.

“…international terrorist groups have proven their resilience and adaptability and now pose a long-term threat to stability and security around the world.”

He recognizes budgetary limitations.

“There is also a fourth ‘force’ that shapes our security environment. Barring an unforeseen change, even as we face new challenges and an increasing pace, the Defense and Navy budgets likely will continue to be under pressure. We will not be able to “buy” our way out of the challenges that we face. The budget environment will force tough choices but must also inspire new thinking.”

Throughout there is an emphasis on understanding history and the strategic concepts of the past. There is also a recognition of the need to work with partners.

“EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN OUR NETWORK OF PARTNERS: Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies and partners – who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.

Other than the Marine Corps, the US Navy has no closer partner than the USCG. The partnership has been a long and successful one, but I would like to see the Navy be a better partner to the Coast Guard.

What I want to see:

If we have “run out of money, now we have to think.” One thing we can do, is to try to get the maximum return from the relatively small investment needed to make the Coast Guard an effective naval reserve force.

  • We need explicit support from the Navy at every level, particularly within the Congress and Administration, for Coast Guard recapitalization.
  • We need an explicit statement from the Navy that they expect the Coast Guard to defend ports against unconventional threats, so that they can keep more forces forward deployed.
  • We need the Navy to supply the weapons we need to defend ports against unconventional attack with a probability approaching 100% ,including small missile systems like Hellfire or Griffin to stop small, fast, highly maneuverable threats and light weight anti-ship torpedoes that target propellers to stop larger threats, and we need those systems on at least all cutters of Webber class and larger.
  • We need to reactivate the Coast Guard’s ASW program and insure that all the new large cutters (NSC and OPC) have and ASW capability, if not installed on all of the cutters, at least planned, prototyped, tested, and practiced on a few ships (particularly in the Pacific).

(Note there is another post on this looking at the “design” from a Navy point of view.)