Some how I missed this when it came out. Lots of topics covered.
Thanks to Luke for bringing this to my attention.
Some how I missed this when it came out. Lots of topics covered.
Thanks to Luke for bringing this to my attention.

John Francis Kelly (born May 11, 1950, pictured here in 2012) is a retired United States Marine Corps general and the former commander of United States Southern Command.
The New York Times has reported that President-Elect Trump has chosen retired Marine General and former SOUTHCOM commander John Kelly to head the Department of Homeland Security.
General Kelly served as SOUTHCOM November 19, 2012 – January 16, 2016. That experience should make him extremely familiar with the Coast Guard. He has supported the Coast Guard in the past, and here.
As I understand it, he will need to have a waiver from the Senate to serve because he retired less than seven years ago, but it appears he will have broad bi-partisan support having received the endorsement of President Obama’s former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.
If you haven’t seen it already, the Coast Guard has a web site that provides a lot of information about the status of the service. The Coast Guard Overview includes sections on Missions, Workforce, Force Laydown, Assets, Authorities, Strategy, Budget, Leadership, Partnerships, and a Resource Library. (You do have to scroll down from the intro.)
I had not seen this before. It seems to be connected to the preparation for the Presidential Transition Team.
Added a link to the web site to the top of my Reference page, so it will be easy to find. I have to say I have not kept my Reference page up to date. I’ll be pay more attention to it.
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Procurement of 14 C-27J aircraft was one of the achievements sited. C-27Js replace C-130s at CGAS Sacramento.
The Commandant has issued a mid-term update on his earlier published “Strategic Intent, 2015-2019” (pdf). The new document is available in pdf format. You can find it here: “United States Coast Guard Commandant’s Strategic Intent, 2015-2019, Mid-Term Report.”
It is relatively short and readable at 21 pages. The recurring themes of the Commandant’s administration are all there, starting with TOC (transnational organized crime) and its deleterious effect on Western Hemisphere governance and prosperity. It does read a little like an Officer Evaluation Report input.
There is nothing particularly surprising here, but even for me, the enumeration of the scope the Coast Guard’s authorities, responsibilities, and international contacts is still mind boggling.
I am not going to try to summarize the report, but there were a few things that struck me.
The Commandant mentions service life extension programs for the seagoing buoy tenders (already begun), the 47 foot MLBs, and the 87 foot WPBs (in the future), but there is no mention of what we will do about the inland tender fleet. There will also be a life extension program for helicopters before they are finally replaced.
“Extend the service life of our rotary wing assets and align with DOD’s Future Vertical Lift initiative.”
There is mention of a program I was not aware of, the “Defense Threat Reduction Agency National Coast Watch System project.” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency attempts to track and reduce the WMD threat. It is not really clear what our role is here. We know about the container inspection programs in foreign ports. Is that it, or is there more to this? (that can be discussed at an unclassified level.)
There is concern that the kind of people smuggling seen in the Mediterranean may soon come to the English Channel, and according to Chief Inspector of Immigration and Borders David Bolt,
“’It isn’t just a question of people-smuggling. This is also a question of firearms, a question of drugs, we have been woefully unprepared.’
According to the post,
“Many European nations have significant coast guards with dozens, or even hundreds of craft working to protect human life at sea and the integrity of borders. Britain instead has a variety of agencies including the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, which has a small number of craft, the Border agency, which presently has two of their five customs cutters deployed to the Mediterranean rather than in home waters, and charities including the Royal National Lifeboat Institution which has no border defence role.
“Of the United Kingdom’s approximately 1,000 ports and harbours, only 500 are large enough to warrant the security features such as fences and restricted areas as mandated by the International Ship and Port Facility Security code, leaving half totally open to smugglers. At many UK ports, police and border force visits can be rare.”
I have no idea how serious this problem really is, or how serious it may become, but it does remind me of one advantage of having a relatively large, agile, multi-mission force as opposed to several smaller, narrowly focused organizations. When the US is suddenly faced with a crisis, be it a humanitarian crisis like the Mariel Boat Lift, weather related like Hurricane Katrina, a man made pollution incident like the Deepwater Horizon, or a natural disaster like the Earthquake in Haiti, the Coast Guard has the organization, the authority, the resources, and the culture that allows it to refocus and respond.
Thanks to Mike for bringing this to my attention.
CIMSEC has a post that suggests the Coast Guard should use live streaming video of on-going boardings, as a way to keep the chain of command informed in real time.
It does seem inevitable we will be going in that direction. The hope is that it will make it possible to provide the guys on scene with greater support. My fear is that it will facilitate micro-management. There is also the possibility this could become a huge time sink for the upper echelons.

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PEGGYÕS COVE, Nova Scotia (Sept. 14, 1998) Ð- Canadian Coast Guard Cutter CCGV Hudson (front) now the oldest major vessel in the Canadian Coast Guard, conducts Laser Line Scanning (LLS) operations with the latest in US Navy developed high-tech equipment at the crash site of SwissAir Flight 111. US Navy photo by PhotographerÕs Mate 1st Class Todd P. Cichonowicz. (RELEASED)
Professional Mariner has reported that a Transport Canada report found the Canadian Coast Guard ” …fleet is undermanned and desperately in need of new ships” and “that unplanned maintenance on aging Coast Guard vessels skyrocketed in 2014.”
My first reaction was of course that they have the same problems we do, but looking at the history of Canadian Coast Guard ship building it is apparent that while none of their ships are over 53 years old, with those built in the 80s the largest group, so maybe they are slightly better off. On the other hand, there was almost no large ship construction in the 1990s or later so they are facing block obsolescence.
I took a look at the documents. I have to admit, I did not read them all. They cover all modes and aspects of transportation. Volume One (pdf) is the basic report and it is 286 pages, and Volume Two (pdf) is the Appendices and it is 230 pages. However, I did use the search function to find every mention of Coast Guard and there were some interesting aspects.
For one thing, the Canadian Coast Guard is partially funded by user fees. The report then goes on to both complain that the user fees have not been raised since established and consequently have not kept up with rising demand and costs, and then also points out that user fees tend to make Canada less competitive. There is not a clear recommendation on this point.
“The government introduced user fees to recover part of the costs for navigation services, which have not changed since 1998. Approximately 15 to 30 percent of the Canadian Coast Guard’s operating costs ($27 million out of $190 million) are recovered from industry (see Figures 9 and 10); icebreaking fees are separate.”
They have a strong justification for the Coast Guard in claiming its inadequacies hurt Canada’s economic competitivenes.
“The underfunding of the Coast Guard seriously hampers its ability to discharge its mandate, which adversely affects Canada’s international competitiveness and trade. (p.13)”
The report finds that the Canadian Coast Guard’s lack of law enforcement authority (and implicitly weapons to back up that authority) results in inefficiencies.
“The Canadian Coast Guard As noted above, the Canadian Coast Guard is responsible for the safe and efficient movement of ships in Canadian coastal and inland waters. Canada is unusual in having a civilian coast guard. In other northern jurisdictions, such as Denmark, Greenland, Norway, Iceland, Finland, and Russia, and in the United States, the coast guard is a military or security organization. As a civilian body, the Canadian Coast Guard does not have the authority to enforce international and national laws and regulations pertaining to the sea, the environment, and sovereignty without RCMP officers present, even though Canadian Coast Guard vessels and staff may be the best placed to respond to critical events and detect illegal activity. This has resulted in an inefficient enforcement regime. Canada has also been slow to use maritime transport to promote development and strengthen sovereignty. Canada must ensure that it meets the challenges of increased maritime traffic in the Arctic, the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, the Seaway, the Pacific and the Atlantic. Because of existing governance arrangements and inadequate funding, the Canadian Coast Guard is not currently well equipped to do so.” (p.220)
The report found that current ship building plans including the requirement to buy Canadian would not addressing the problem of an aging fleet.
“As noted above and as depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3, the Canadian Coast Guard fleet is aging, which has implications for maintenance as well as procurement. Given that 29 percent of the large vessels are more than 35 years old and close to 60 percent of small vessels are older than the design life of 20 years, it is not surprising that the number of major systems repairs required is increasing, vessel days are decreasing, and the number of ships out of service is increasing over time. The decrease in 2009 was as a result of money dedicated for repairs paid by the Economic Action Plan. Indeed, for such a critical piece of transportation infrastructure, the Canadian Coast Guard is not receiving the political attention, or the administrative and financial resources it requires. In 2014, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development found that the Canadian Coast Guard’s icebreaking presence in the Arctic is decreasing, while vessel traffic is increasing.26 In response, the Canadian Coast Guard, Transport Canada, and the Canadian Hydrographic Service are currently advancing the Northern Marine Transportation Corridors Initiative to support responsible marine development, enhance marine navigation safety, and guide future Arctic investments.27 In addition, the 2015 Report of the Independent Review of the M/V Marathassa Fuel Oil Spill Environmental Response Operation found that the Canadian Coast Guard lacked adequate staff to respond in any part of its region at any time.28 Not only is it understaffed, but its fleet is one of the oldest in the world and urgently requires renewal (individual ships average nearly 34 years of age).29 Without such renewal it will have to pull ships from service, further reducing reliability. However, under the National Shipbuilding and Procurement Strategy, which requires the Canadian Coast Guard to purchase ships from Canadian shipyards, it can only replace one ship a year, at most. At that rate, the median age of the fleet will not decrease. Other strategies, such as outsourcing or leasing, are not part of the strategy and thus cannot be deployed to meet short-term requirements. (p.221)
There may be beaurocratic power grab here, in that Transport Canada seems to want the Canadian Coast Guard transferred under it purview rather than the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. In fact the Canadian Coast Guard had been an agency of the Department of Transportation until 1994 when it was moved to Fisheries and Oceans.
“We have been concerned for some time that the separate and distinctive roles of Transport Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard [make for] a less than efficient model for a coordinated and timely response to a maritime emergency. The situation is further compounded by CCG having been placed under the administration of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans whose role has little in common with that of CCG.” “p.231)
The Canadian Coast Guard is organizationally a mid-point between the single agency multiple tasked broad authority USCG model and the multiple specialized agencies UK model. In some respects it also incorporates elements that would correspond to duties performed in the US by NOAA and National Marine Fisheries. Apparently it, like the USCG has had a problem fitting in any one department because of its multiple missions. While it is under the Department of Fish and Oceans, since 2005 it has been designated a “special operating agency” with greater autonomy.
Notably the prevailing Canadian attitude seems to be that, if anything, the CCG needs to be given weapons and law enforcement authority, bringing it closer to the USCG model, so perhaps it is an endorsement of sorts, for the way the USCG is structured.
Perhaps the USCG needs to be a “special operating agency” or “independent agency” as it is called in the US, as well; after all, there are already 27 (or more) of them, but that is a topic for another day.
Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.
Coast Guard Compass has once again held a competition for Coast Guard video of the year and the results are in. All ten are worth a look.
Navy photo: The U.S. Navy Cyclone-class coastal patrol ships assigned to Patrol Coastal Squadron 1 (PCRON 1), USS Hurricane (PC-3), USS Chinook (PC-9) and USS Typhoon (PC-5), transit in formation during a divisional tactics exercise in the Persian Gulf.
The Navy has announced they have three 387 ton (fl) Cyclone class patrol craft based in Mayport, rotating through the 4th Fleet’s area in support of Operation Martillo, the counter drug operation off Central America.
We know there are not enough ships to respond to all the intelligence we have on drug trafficing in SouthCom’s area of responsibility.
These little ships are considerably smaller than those we normally send South, but they are very similar in size to the new 353 ton Webber class WPCs. We have six Webber class in Miami, six in Key West, and will soon have six in Puerto Rico. If we could rotate some of these through the Transit zones, they might make a difference.
Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.
Reading the “National Fleet Plan” prompted some thoughts on where we homeport cutters. What started as a look at homeports then morphed into a look at, if there will be enough large cutters (NSCs and OPCs) in the “program of record” to protect our ports from a terrorist attack. That expanded a bit further. Could we also protect our strategic seaports? The Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) system would after all want to make sure merchant ships were not used to sow mines off our coast.
Warning: This is going to be a rambling post, so let me apologize in advance.
Note, I looked at this from the point of view of making an intercept off shore, so rather than look at specific ports, in some cases, I clustered ports that had a common approach, e.g. Portsmouth, Norfolk, and Newport News all share a common approach so I grouped them together in what I will refer to as the Chesapeake Bay Complex. Other groups were ports around Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, Galveston Bay, and Sabine Pass. I also disregarded Inland and Great Lakes ports.
The National Fleet Plan included these particular stated intentions for the future.
– Fiscal Year 2015: Submit revised Strategic Laydown (SLD) request and OCR to homeport 3 X FRCs at Naval Base Guam to include Lessons Learned from maturing CG-7/OPNAV N51 MOA.
– Fiscal Year 2015: Process Organization Change Request to homeport 3 X Medium Endurance Cutters at Naval Station Pensacola.
– Support feasibility studies to identify potential homeport locations for West Coast Offshore Patrol Cutters
There are a lot of obvious advantages in homeporting at a Navy Base, particularly if Navy surface vessels are also based there. There are likely to be training, logistics, and maintenance support available on base and probably a shipyard will be nearby, meaning the cutter will not have to be away from homeport for their availabilities. But perhaps Coast Guard needs a wider dispersal of its assets than the Navy does.
Although I have my doubts about how the larger cutters are currently armed, I approached this from what I believe to be the Coast Guard’s view, that if there is an attack by terrorists using a medium to large ship, the most likely unit to counter it is a large cutter. This is implicit in the term “National Security Cutter” and the designations, WMSL for the NSC and WMSM for the Offshore Patrol Cutters, e.g. Maritime Security, Large and Medium. (Why is there never a small–WMSS or WSEC?)
I also made the somewhat plausible assumption, that an intercept is more likely to be successful if the cutter is based in or near the port that is being protected. An intercept requires at least one cycle of the OODA Loop, e.g., Observe (detect), Orient (evaluated), Decide (on a course of action), and Act. It is going to take some time to determine that an intercept is needed, and more time to communicated the decision. If the cutter is in or near the port to be protected, we are more likely to be able to make a successful intercept.
The USN homeports surface combatants in only five distinct geographic areas, the Chesapeake Bay (Norfolk and Little Creek, VA); Mayport, FL, San Diego, CA; Puget Sound (Everett and Bremerton, WA); and Pearl Harbor, HI. The Navy is increasingly concentrated geographically. Navy ships generally are in maintenance, in training, deployed far from the US or are in transit. They no longer routinely patrol US waters. This may not be a problem if you can handle a problem with aircraft, but reaction to a vessel that we suspect may be attempting a terrorist attack will almost certainly require investigation, including, most probably, an attempt to board.
I was actually kind of shocked when I first realized the Navy had no surface combatants in the Atlantic Fleet homeported North of Virginia. We cannot rely on the Navy to do intercepts, with the possible exception of off San Diego and Chesapeake Bay.
The current fleet of approximately 40 NSCs/WHECs/WMECs (it is a moving target) is distributed among 18 homeports in 13 states:
CCGD1:
CCGD5:
CCGD7:
CCGD8:
CCGD11:
CCGD13:
CCGD14:
CCGD17:
The Coast Guard fleet is much more geographically distributed than that of the Navy. The Coast Guard’s average of about two ships per homeport is probably not optimal in terms of maintenance. There are good reasons to group at least three ships of the same type together. This almost guarantees that at least one ship will be in port at all times, permitting shore side support to be usefully employed in continuous support of the ships. Three ships in each homeport also almost guarantees that at least one of the ships is fully operational.
There are several reasons for the choice of homeports.
Terrorist Target List (Playing Red Cell):
Lets look at what ports need to be protected, based on what characteristics make a port a potential target. I looked at it from the terrorists point of view. “How can I hurt the United States and make the biggest impact?”
Since the terrorists targets are more about psychological impact than economic or military significance, attacking certain cities may be more important than the actual damage done. Cities that likely figure large in their psyches are:
Next, there are symbols of American military power, that terrorist groups would like to show are not invulnerable. Plus, if they could also at least raise the possibility of a spill of radioactive material, so much the better. So nuclear powered ships of any kind are likely targets.
Attacks on Shipyards that build USN ships might also provide an opportunity to strike at US symbols of power. Notable shipyards are BIW in Bath, Me; Electric Boat in Groton, CT; Newport News in the Chesapeake Bay complex, VA; Austal USA in Mobile, AL; HII in Pascagoula, MS; and NASSCO in San Diego, CA.
Another likely target is a cruise ship. The Top Cruise Ship Ports:
Large container ports might also be seen as a good way to disrupt the economy. Top Container Ports:
More generally, Top US waterports by tonnage:
Military Targets:
Aside from the military targets listed above MARAD has designated 23 ports for outload of military equipment. These are referred to as “Strategic Seaports”:
Consolidated Target Port List:
Obviously there is some overlap from list to list. Putting them all together and grouping them by district we get these 30 ports:
CCGD1:
CCGD5:
CCGD7:
CCGD8:
CCGD11:
CCGD13:
CCGD14:
CCGD17:
Homeport:
If we complete the “Program of Record” we will have 33 major cutters, 8 Bertholf class and 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters. The Bertolf class are already planned to go to Charleston, Alameda (San Francisco Bay), and Honolulu, HI, three ports on the target list. The 25 OPCs might best be distributed among eight or nine ports (7 ports with three ships and either one with four or two with two each). That would only cover at most 12 ports.
Looking at it another way, if we assumed that these 33 ships were all successfully using the “crew rotation concept” and were available 225 days a year, that would give us 20.3 ships available on an average day. Certainly, not all of these are going to be available because some will be in Alaska and some will be in the Eastern Pacific. Hopefully the Western Pacific will also be patrolled and some will be in training.
Observations:
The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) will be based in San Diego and Mayport. Since the new cutters will share systems with the LCS, there will be a strong case for homeporting at least some of the OPCs in San Diego and Mayport.
Even though the Gulf of Mexico ports may appear somewhat protected by the relatively narrow entrances, the proximity of Mexican waters also means that it may be only a relatively short run from Mexican waters to a US port. That cuts the reaction time available to detect an anomaly, decide there is a need for an intercept, and sortie a cutter to intercept it. (We could say the same thing about San Diego and LA/Long Beach.)
Looking at the distribution of ports and the current distribution of cutters, it looks like CGD8 (Gulf of Mexico) needs more than the two 210s currently assigned. The proposal to put three MECs in Panama City looks like a good idea even if Panama City itself doesn’t look like a likely target because of the proximity of Mobile, Pascagoula, Gulfport and the Mississippi Delta. Undoubtedly there are support facilities in the area. Still it is on the Eastern extreme of the District and not centrally located relative to these ports. Mobile or Gulfport are more centrally located.
Another place we might want to put assets is Naval Station Ingleside, next to Corpus Christi. Ingleside is currently the home of all the Navy’s US based Mine-Warfare ships. The port was originally intended to support a carrier battlegroup, but with the reduced size of the navy and with Littoral Combat ships (which will be based in San Diego and Mayport) assuming the Mine Warfare role and replacing the Minesweepers and Minehunters, Ingleside is certain to have unused capacity. It would give the Coast Guard a base in the Western half of the Gulf of Mexico.
There are obvious advantages to basing in San Diego. It is not just a Naval Base, it is one of two US ports where Littoral Combat Ships will be based and LCS share systems with the new cutters. Training, Logistical, and technical support should be excellent. Still of all the US ports, San Diego is the least likely to need additional Coast Guard help in defending the port. We might do better to base ships in LA/Long Beach which is still close enough to enjoy some benefit from the proximity to San Diego.
We could probably say something similar about the Chesapeake Bay Complex. A Coast Guard boarding party delivered by a WPB or riding a Destroyer is probably all the help they will need in defending the port.
Notably, missing from my target ports list are Boston MA; Key West, FL; the Columbia River/Portland, OR, and Kodiak, AK, suggesting, at least from this limited point of view, these may not be the best choices of homeport. These four ports are currently homeport to nine large cutters. Boston surprised me. There are several potential targets of historical significance in Boston that might attract attention, including the USS Constitution.
The Problem:
Only if we stopped doing anything else, could we, perhaps, provide enough large cutters to provide a reasonable assurance of being able to intercept a medium to large ship suspected to having terrorist intentions, on our top 20 ports. Even if we did this, there would still be other targets that would not be protected.
All along, I have been saying our cutter are not adequately armed to have a high probability of being able to stop such a vessel. I think this shows that, in fact, there is a good chance we might not have a major cutter capable of making such an intercept in the first place.
If my arguments are not convincing, it is not necessary to accept my conclusions, test the hypothesis. Form a red cell to conduct a series of random paper exercises against the Maritime Domain Awareness system. For each exercise, have the red cell pick a target and lay out a ship’s track. Note when the track might be detected and the probability of detection, if missed on the first opportunity, when would it have been detected? add how long to evaluate? how long to make a decision? how long to communicate? Note where our potential intercepting vessels are, and how long it would take to assign them the task and how long would it take to intercept. We don’t actually need to move any assets, but after several repetitions, we should have an idea how good our current system actually is.
The WPB/WPC Alternative:
We could solve this problem and obviate the need to even consider maritime security in the basing of large cutters, if we gave the job of intercepting potential terrorist vessel to the WPCs and WPBs and armed them properly for the task.
All the potential target ports have WPBs and/or WPCs either in the port or nearby, and in many cases they have three or more.
The necessary weapons are neither large nor expensive–a couple of light weight torpedoes to stop larger vessels and some Hellfire or Griffin class small anti-surface missiles to deal with small, fast, highly maneuverable threats. There are currently no US made dedicated anti-surface torpedoes, but they would not be hard to make. Meanwhile, it might be possible to use Mk46 or Mk54 torpedoes by selecting the right minimum and maximum search depths, if the right options are available. The smaller cutters might actually have advantages in speed, maneuverability, and shallow draft.
The Aviation Alternative:
There is perhaps an assumption that there are plenty of forces in the US to deal with this problem, so why do we need to beef up the Coast Guard. But utilizing those forces will require changes to the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Army and the way they work.
Conceivably we could send a Coast Guard helicopter, supported by a DOD aircraft, off shore to tell a suspicious vessel to heave to until we can send a vessel, most probably a WPC or WPB, to board and inspect the vessel. If they refuse to stop, even after using the airborne use of force package to fire across the bow, or if they proved hostile to the boarding party, it could be attacked by DOD aircraft.
Unfortunately it seems the other armed forces do not readily embark on missions that have not been approved, exercised, and briefed well in advance. So far, I have seen no evidence we have been doing exercises that would make this alternative feasible. DOD units in the US are here to rest, train and reequip. Nothing could be more alien to most of them than to attack a merchant vessel of the US coast. We saw this lack of preparedness on 9/11 when two F-16s launched with the intention of ramming one of the hijacked aircraft because they had no weapons. Now there are aircraft prepared for Air-to-Air, but I suspect anti-ship preparedness is much as it was pre-9/11.
The Navy Alternative:
This is really a Navy mission that we have somehow accepted responsibility for, allowing the Navy to base their ships in the most efficient manner, while they show the flag everywhere in the world except in our own waters.
If we cannot do this job, we need to make the Department, the Administration, and the Navy understand that we cannot be held responsible for a task we have not been properly equipped to perform and that while the Coast Guard will assist, this is really not our job, its the Navy’s.
I don’t really think we want to do that. It is giving up. It is repudiating the idea that the Coast Guard is a real armed force, with real military missions.
Conclusion:
We really need to start acting like we believe these threats are credible. We need to be brutally honest in appraising the Coast Guard’s current weaknesses, and we need a sense of urgency in addressing those weaknesses.
Giving the Maritime Security job to the WPCs and WPBs and equipping them accordingly is fastest, cheapest route to a credible capability. Otherwise there is a good chance some poor JG, his crew, and his boat, armed with only a couple of .50 cal. may be the only thing standing between a much larger and possibly better armed terrorist controlled ship and its target.