An artist rendering of South Korea’s new Chamsuri-211 fast patrol boat
(Credit: Yonhap)
NavyRecognition is reporting the South Korean Navy will be getting the first of a new class of Patrol Craft in late 2017. It is a bit smaller than the Webber class at 44 meters in length and 210 tons. It is designed specifically to counter North Korean Hovercraft. It is armed with a 76 mm gun and a pair of remotely operated, radar controlled 12.7mm (.50 cal.) machine guns. The unusual weapon seen on the stern is a launcher for 130mm (5.1″) guided rockets (apparently twelve) . (I suspect these are actually guided versions of the 5″ Zuni rocket, much like the APKWS is a guided version of the Hydra rocket. )
The vessels is expected to have a max speed of about 40 knot and will apparently be powered by waterjets. I don’t see any boat on the artist impression above.
Test firing of the 57mm Bofors aboard USCGC Bertholf, photo by MMagaro
Are our weapons adequate for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Mission? Let’s find out.
The Navy Times is reporting that the Navy will have an unusually large number of ships available for “Sink-Ex” exercises in 2017.
The SINKEX fleet grew from five ships last year to seven ships available in 2017, including four frigates, the landing ship tank Racine and two attack cargo ships.
According to the source document, the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan (pp 13/14), one of the stated purposes of a Sink-EX is weapons effectiveness evaluation. I think this might be a good opportunity for us to test out our weapons for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission. This mission implies we must have the ability to forcibly stop a ship, regardless of its size. A Sink-Ex could be an opportunity to answer once and for all the question “Is the Coast Guard adequately armed for the mission?” Personally I don’t think so, and what little evidence we have seems to indicate that is the case.
The two attack cargo ships are Charleston class LKAs, the ex-Durham (LKA-114) and ex-St. Louis (LKA-116), built in the late ’60s. These are medium sized auxiliary ships, 9,000 tons light and 18,500 tons fully loaded, 576 feet (176 meters) in length. Structurally they are not much different from merchant ships of the period. Unfortunately they don’t have the big diesel engines found on modern merchant ships, and the are far smaller than many current merchant ships but they are still, in most respects, representative of the target set the Coast Guard should be interested in.
Photo: USS Charleston (LKA-113)
We have four gun systems that might be tested. .50 cal., 25 mm, 57 mm, and 76 mm. The 25 mm and 57 mm are particularly important as the .50 cal is probably too small and short ranged and the 76 mm is going out of service. Still, we should still attempt to include the 76 mm because if the 57 mm proves inadequate, our next question should be, “Would the 76 mm have been successful?” Testing the 25, 57, and 76 mm guns would require use of at least two ships, a 378 for both the 76 and 25 mm, and a Bertholf class for the 57 mm. (Alternately an LCS might provide the 57 mm, a Bear class the 76 mm, and a 110 or Webber class the 25 mm.)
This could be a CG R&D project, but of course it would require Navy assistance, perhaps a joint project. Because our objective is to at least stop the target, rather than sink it, loss of power or steering would constitute a success. To determine if this is the case, we need information about what is happening inside the hull when the we get a hit. Will the round penetrate not only the hull but also critical systems, the loss of which would result in loss of power or control of the ship? Because it would probably be dangerous to go back on board the target after it has been shelled, the target would need to be instrumented with sensors and the results broadcast back. Aside from putting cameras inside the spaces, a technique might be to seal up and pressurize equipment like boilers, turbines, and steering gear and have them instrumented to detect any loss of pressure that would indicate a breach.
We would also want to conduct the exercise at a reasonable ranges. Since the real targets might be equipped with weapons that might be typically available to terrorist organizations, including anti-tank missiles and Soviet era antitank and anti-aircraft guns,that might target critical systems on the cutter, I believe the cutter should stand off at least 4000 yards, but for the 25 mm, we would probably need to close to 3,000 yards. A logical sequence might be,
378 closes to 3000 yards engages with 25 mm then withdraws
NSC closes to 4,000 yards and engages, then withdraws
378 closes to 4,000 yards and engages.
We would also want to fire a reasonable number of rounds, probably about 150 rounds of 25 mm, about 100 rounds of 57 mm, and about 80 rounds of 76 mm, basically shoot enough to exhaust the ammunition normally carried on the mount.
Realistically this would have to be part of a larger Sink-Ex with more than one target, but it might be reasonable to allow the Coast Guard a day to try their systems against one of the targets before the other firing units come on scene.
Should our current systems prove not up to the task, we would also want to know the results for possible candidate systems, so we might ask that these candidate systems be used against the target as well. These might include, APKWS, Griffin, Hellfire, the 5″ gun, and the light weight torpedo. I don’t think it has ever been tried, but with the right depth settings, is it possible to hit a deep draft surface target with our current light weight torpedoes?
Let’s at least find out if we have a chance of succeeding in this mission.
It seems technology is making hitting small, fast, maneuverable targets with precision not only easier, but also cheaper.
We have talked before about the possibility of using small guided missiles (Hellfire, Brimstone, Griffin, or 70 mm guided rockets like APKWS) to allow the Coast Guard to engage small, fast, highly maneuverable threats, while minimizing the chances of collateral damage that accompany the use of unguided rounds from machineguns or auto cannon. Now there seems to be another alternative, and it even has a history of use by the Coast Guard, the 81 mm mortar.
Popular Mechanics reports the Marines will be getting a guided 81 mm round called ACERM (Advanced Capability Extended Range Mortar) that will incorporate both a GPS, and potentially more importantly for the Coast Guard, a semi-active laser (SAL) guidance system that should provide a one meter circular error probability (CEP, that is 50% of the rounds will fall within one meter of where the laser is pointed). Additionally the round will have a range of about 18 kM, comparable to that of a 76 or 57 mm gun. Cost per round is expected to be about $10,000. That is more than the China Lake Spike, but range is much greater and the warhead is substantially larger.
The firecontrol computer/programmer is a two pound “Miniature Mission Setter,” in reality a rugged Android tablet.
In addition to the Popular Mechanics post, I also found this power point presentation (pdf) that provides more detail.
The 81 mm mortars the Coast Guard used in the Vietnam era are all gone now, but they were hardly high tech, expensive, or difficult to produce.
Maybe we at least need the laser designator anyway:
Like some of the other systems considered, in addition to the mortar and mortar rounds, to use these effectively, we would need a laser designator. Based on a recent contract award, laser designators cost about $60,000 each.
Laser designators might be a good idea anyway. If we need to call in assistance from the Navy, Marine Corp, or particularly the Air Force or Army (who tend to be clueless about marine targets), one of the issues will be identifying the target, and a laser designator would be a good way to do that. Not only to identify the target, but also to show where we want them hit.
Limitations:
While the potential range of the 81mm mortar round may be over 18,000 yards, for our purposes, its effective range is probably limited by the range of the laser designator which can be further limited by atmospheric conditions like fog, rain, snow, smoke or sand storms (like might be encountered in the Persian Gulf). The Power Point brief does suggest that a small unmanned air system (sUAS) equipped with a designator, might be used to complement (and extend) the system.
Because this is a high angle weapon, with the projectile designed to strike the target in a vertical dive, and because the warhead uses “High Density Pre-Formed Fragments” that would presumably spread out horizontally, it probably would not be particularly effective against medium to large ships. It seems to be intended primarily as an antipersonnel weapon. The danger radius for fragments might even be an issue in some circumstances.
It is still a crew served weapon with the crew highly visible and exposed.
Advantages:
Unlike some missile in a box systems, this looks like a gun. It might have some deterrent value in some circumstances.
Reportedly it makes the 50 cal. mounted piggy back more accurate.
If we were in a situation like Market Time, where patrol boats might incidentally support troops ashore, this might be a good option.
Is it the “best” alternative?:
We have an array of possible systems to address the possibility of a maritime terrorist threats. Hellfire, Brimstone, Griffin, APKWS, the China Lake Spike, this smart 81 mm mortar round. All would probably be effective against smaller targets. None are likely to be fully effective against larger targets.
For the larger threats, I have been suggesting WPCs, and probably WPBs, be equipped with light weight torpedoes or even a variant of the anti-torpedo torpedo, to use as a ship stopper that could home on the target’s propellers,
LRASM might also be an alternative. Coordinating a long range LRASM strike is more complex and probably more expensive than the torpedo alternative. On the other hand, it would bring along with it a new naval wartime capability that would support the Navy’s “Distributed Lethality Initiative.”
We really need a set of capabilities that provide a high probability against any element of a spectrum of threats, because if any one element is not addressed, that is likely the element terrorists will select.
This is an expanded version of an earlier piece that was posted here. I rewrote it for the CIMSEC blog in hopes it would find a larger audience. Hopefully it is a clearer than the original.
The Coast Guard has a problem. It is not currently equipped to perform one of its missions, and it appears no other agency is prepared to cover the deficiency. The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) may be a possible solution.
“The PWCS mission entails the protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS)…prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks… Conducting PWCS deters terrorists from using or exploiting the MTS as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population centers, vessels, critical infrastructure, and key resources.”
The Shortfall
Implicit in this mission is that the service should have the capability to forcibly stop a non-compliant ship, any ship, of any size. If a crew is motivated by simple greed, a .50 caliber machine gun is probably enough to convince them to take their chances in court rather than resist, but if the crew is motivated by a fanatical, or even suicidal belief in a cause, they become much harder to stop.
Terrorist targets are limited only by their imagination. They might include something like the Mumbai attack, an assault on a bridge, an LNG tanker or facility, a nuclear power plant, a passenger ship, an SSBN departing on patrol, or they might use a vessel to bring in a nuclear weapon.
The Coast Guard is an armed force at all times, but it is certainly not heavily armed. In fact, in terms of stopping a recalcitrant merchant ship, the Coast Guard seems relatively less capable now than they were eighty years ago.
This is because of the rapid growth in the size of merchant ships. Even the largest cutters with their 57 mm and 76 mm guns are far less capable of stopping today’s over 100,000 ton merchant vessels than the cutters of the 1930s, with their 5″ guns were against ships that were typically well under 10,000 tons.
Worse yet, the units that would actually be on scene to attempt to stop and board a ship suspected of being under the control of terrorists is unlikely to include any of the larger cutters because they seldom remain near harbor entrance. Rather, they are frequently sent well off shore.
The Coast Guard simply does not have the capability to deal with a terrorist attack using a medium to large sized merchant ship, and it currently appears that there is no other organization capable of answering this threat in the 30 or more port complexes terrorists might find worthwhile targets.
Our Friends
Navy surface forces, in U.S. waters, are too geographically concentrated. Navy ships tend to be either in homeport, working up in specific geographic areas, deployed, or in transit to deploy. There are no Navy surface warships homeported in the Gulf of Mexico, on the East Coast north of the New Port News/Norfolk complex, in Alaska, or on the West coast between San Diego and Puget Sound with weapons equal to or better than those on cutters. For many ports, the nearest Navy surface vessel is hundreds of miles away.
Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army Air are not on standby around the U.S. armed with anti-ship weapons. Of the Air Force, only some strategic aircraft are training for the anti-shipping mission. Fighters and attack aircraft do not. The author suspects the U.S. would not get a timely response from the Air Force to a no notice requirement to stop a maritime target. Units that are not trained for an anti-shipping role cannot be easily pressed into that mission.
A Possible Solution
LRASM, with an over 200 nautical mile range and the ability to strike selected locations on a target ship, could possibly provide an answer. If the U.S. fielded LRASM on all nine National Security Cutters (NSC) and 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) currently planned, its over 200 mile range could cover virtually all of these ports, and likely have a weapon on target within 20 minutes of launch.
When the maritime domain awareness system detects the approach of a suspicious vessel, a small patrol vessel (WPB or WPC) is assigned to intercept it and conduct a boarding to determine the vessel’s nature and intent.
When the patrol vessel is assigned the intercept, a larger cutter that may be at some distance, but within range, would be directed to provide support in the form of a LRASM launch if necessary.
The patrol craft will transmit video, position, course, and speed during its approach which will allow the start of mission planning for an LRASM launch should it become necessary. The results of the patrol craft’s attempt to board will allow determination of hostile intent.
Once a determination of hostile intent has been made, and deadly force authorized, the supporting cutter can launch its weapon. The patrol craft will continually update the supporting cutter before and during the flight of the LRASM. Navy, Joint, and/or Allied procedures would be used to call for a strike, and should also work with other service’s assets if they are available.
It is likely cutters could be equipped to carry eight missiles, but for peacetime purposes, two per ship would almost certainly meet the Coast Guard’s needs. Since some ships will always be in maintenance with ammunition removed, and others may be deployed where carrying the weapons would be counterproductive. The Coast Guard is unlikely to ever require more than about 50 missiles to meet its peacetime needs. A very rough estimate of LRASM unit cost would be something on the order of $2M to $5M each. That means the total cost of the missiles is likely between $100M and $250M. Adding launchers, control systems, and installations to cost would almost certainly be less than $500M. These costs would be spread over several years. This gives only an order of magnitude estimate, but it is several orders of magnitude less than the cost of other systems being deployed to protect the U.S. from attack.
Since the missiles, their launchers, and control systems are Navy type/Navy Owned equipment, the Navy would be responsible for paying for them. The cost of adding another four missiles per year for the Coast Guard to the Navy’s buy for LRASM could be lost in the rounding errors in the Navy budget.
For the Coast Guard, the program would probably require no more than 150 additional billets ashore and afloat. Not insignificant, but doable.
Conclusion
If the LRASM performs as advertised, its combination of range, warhead, and intelligent targeting may allow the Coast Guard’s small, but widely distributed force to effectively cover virtually the entire U.S. coast.
Late addition, LRASM deck mount launcher successful test.
Jane’s 360 is reporting that the S. Korean Coast Guard has commissioned their largest and most heavily armed cutter.
Lee Chung-ho has a length of 150.5 m, a beam of 16.5 m, a loaded displacement of 6500 tonnes and a complement of 104 persons, although 140 persons can be embarked.
The hybrid propulsion system has four MTU 20V1163M94 diesels (each rated at 9,900 bhp) and two 750KW electric motors that are connected to the propellers.
How big is it?
The cutter, at 6,500 tons, is 44% larger than the Bertholf class. While its length and beam are almost identical to Japan Coast Guard’s two largest cutters, the displacement is reportedly far less. I have seen no info on the draft, so that is at least possible. In any case, it is definitely much smaller than the huge cutters the Chinese have built.
The post compares the new cutter to the slightly smaller Sambong-ho (pennant 5001), which entered service in 2002 and was previously the largest cutter in the S. Korean Coast Guard, stating it is three knots faster. That would indicate a top speed of 24 knots. The new cutter has a four diesel power plant compared to its predecessor’s two engine plant. In addition, the two 750 HP electric motors mounted on the shafts which should allow the cutter to slow cruise while the main diesels are cold iron.
Weapons:
According to Wikipedia, S. Korean has 34 cutters over 1000 tons. All are armed with one or more 20 mm Vulcan Gatling Guns and .50 caliber machine guns. Fourteen have Bofors 40 mm guns, and one other also has a 76 mm. The 20 mm and 40 mm mounts are locally produced in S. Korea.
Looking at the armament, it may be an upgrade compared to the typical S. Korean cutter, but only slightly better armed than what appears to be, becoming a world wide standard for offshore patrol vessels–a medium caliber gun, 57 or 76 mm, and a pair of 20 to 30mm machineguns in remotely controlled weapon stations. It is really no better armed than the 1,150 ton PC-1005, the Hankang, smallest of S. Korea’s 34 cutters major cutters, commissioned in 1985.
All the weapons appear to have been recycled from previous installations. In the photo, an older model OTO Melara 76 mm, like those used on the FRAMed Hamilton class WHECs and Bear class WMECs is clearly visible on the bow. There is also a Vulcan 20 mm mount on the O-3 deck superfiring over the 76 mm mount forward of the bridge. It also appears to have a locally built twin Bofors 40 mm compact mount using an earlier version of the Bofors than the 70 caliber weapon currently offered, which appears to be atop the superstructure aft. She has no CIWS, missiles, or ASW capability.
What is it with these very large cutters?:
Japan, China, and S. Korea, have now each built two very large cutters. Why to they exist?
It is their size, not their weapons, that make them exceptional. The Russian Coast Guard has smaller, but much more heavily armed ships (Krivak III frigates and Grisha II class corvettes).
There has been a general trend for ships of all types to grow in size. Their crews are not exceptionally large, so the operating cost may not be that much more.
Still these are significantly bigger than other cutters built by the same coast guards, at the same time, apparently for the same missions.
None of these three nations has a patrol area as distant and demanding as Alaska.
Japan did have a reason for building the first of these. Shikishima, commissioned in 1992, was intended to escort plutonium transport ships between Europe and Japan, but I have seen no explanation for the ships that followed.
Is it prestige, just “keeping up with the Jones?”
Are they intended for a future shoving match? If so, they are giving up agility for presence.
Are they perhaps intended as flag ships for long term operations?
I would love to hear the reasoning from someone in the know.
We have talked about the need for a small missile to deal with small, fast, highly maneuverable threats, with less chance of collateral damage than is inherent in using guns. We have talked about Hellfire, Brimstone, Griffin, and guided 70mm rockets. Now it appears there is now an even smaller and much cheaper weapon that seems almost ideal for this end of the target spectrum. It has been in development for quite a while, but appears ready for production. Its range and precision appear to be much better than the machine guns we are currently using.
The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division at China Lake has developed a very small missile called “Spike,” and the price is right–a marginal coast for each additional missile of only about $5000. This should not be confused with the Israeli missile family also called Spike. The following from the Wikipedia entry on the system:
Spike was designed by the U.S. Navy, with assistance from DRS Technologies, and is proclaimed to be “the world’s smallest guided missile.” Initially made to be carried by U.S. Marines, with three missiles and the launcher able to fit in a standard backpack, it weighs 5.4 lb (2.4 kg), is 25 in (640 mm) long, and 2.25 in (57 mm) in diameter. The warhead weighs about 1 lb (450 gr) and employs the Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) effect, made to penetrate before detonating. It is powered by a small rocket motor that gives it a range exceeding 2 mi (3.2 km), making it safer and more accurate than rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). The missile is directed to its target by either an electro-optical (EO) or semi-active laser (SAL) seeker; the EO camera is similar to a basic cellphone camera, containing a 1-megapixel video camera that allows the shooter to select the area to engage in a fire-and-forget mode. The EO seeker cannot operate at night, so the SAL would have to be used. A third targeting mode is inertial, meaning the user can “snap and shoot” at a target without needing to lock on out to 200 meters. Both the Spike missile and reusable launcher each cost $5,000 and weigh 10 lb (4.5 kg) loaded, compared to 49 lb (22 kg) for a Javelin missile and fire control unit.
It has an unusual development history, being developed in house, quickly, at low cost, in response to a “rapid development capabilities” (RDC) program. Consequently the government now owns the design and can be assembled by contractors with no prior missile manufacturing experience and uses Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) components.
It is included in the FY2017 Navy budget along with Griffin and Javalin as program element 3342: “Griffin Missile” intended to develop and deliver Counter-Swarm Small Boat defense capabilities for the Surface Fleet. (It is also interesting to see that this program still anticipates the use of the Griffin missile system (GMS) by the LCS even though the Long Bow Hellfire has already been selected to arm these ships.)
The missile is reportedly also effective against UAVs, helicopters, and some general aviation aircraft, so it should offer a degree of defense against attacks using these types of platforms.
Where should we have them? The six WPBs stationed in Bahrain and the two force protection units at King’s Bay and Bangor that escort SSBNs as they transit from homeport to deepwater come to mind as perhaps the highest priority, but we have at least 30 ports that need protection. Total distribution of the systems might be slightly more than 200 including ultimately one for each of the 37sectors, 58 Webber class WPCs, 73 Marine Protector class 87 foot WPBs, plus 34 larger ships.
If the reported costs are correct a unit might be outfitted with a shoulder launcher and three missiles for as little as $20,000. If so, 200 weapon sets would cost only $4M and they would presumably be paid for by the Navy over several years.
Of course, if we are going to use their semi-active laser homing capability at night, we will need to get past current restrictions on the use of lasers.
Concept image issued by the Russian Ministry of Defence of the Project 23550 ice-class patrol ships for the Russian Navy. Source: Russian MoD
Janes360 is reporting that the Russian Ministry of Defense has awarded contracts for two new ice class patrol vessels that are reportedly capable of operating in ice up to 1.5 meters thick (approx. 5 feet).
The class is described (in Russian) by the MoD as being “without analogues in the world”, and combining “the qualities of tug, ice-breaker, and patrol boat”.
To me it looks an awful lot like the Norwegian Coast Guard vessel Svalbard or Canada’s Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship that is based on the Svalbard’s design.
Jane’s notes, “A concept image released by the MoD showed the vessel armed with a medium-calibre main gun on the foredeck (likely an A-190 100 mm naval gun), a helicopter deck and hangar, and two aft payload bays each fitted with a containerised missile launch system (akin to the Club-K system offered for export) armed with four erectable launch tubes – presumably for either Club anti-ship or Kalibr-NK land-attack missiles. Although billed as patrol boats, this level of armament makes them better armed than many corvettes.”
If these are in fact containerized missile systems, then they may simply be optional equipment, added to the conceptual image to give the ship a bit more swagger, and we may never actually see this. If you are breaking ice for a vessel following close behind, you may not want missiles with their warheads and high energy fuel located near the stern where a collision with a vessel following too close might rupture a missile and start a fire.
It does suggest that a few spaces for containers could turn almost any ship into a potential missile platform.
The Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (ASB(I) 15) conducts an operational demonstration of the Office of Naval Research (ONR)-sponsored Laser Weapon System (LaWS) while deployed to the Arabian Gulf. U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams
This Navy Times story is one of several I have seen that report Rep. Duncan Hunter’s (R-CA) displeasure that the Coast Guard is unable to use some of its laser equipment because of FDA regulation.
“The equipment in question is the Electro-Optical Sensor System and the PEQ-15, a laser sight with an illuminator. ESS is a turret installed on Coast Guard helicopters, with a laser illuminator that can enhance camera images, while PEQ-15 is a rifle sight with a laser illuminator. The Coast Guard is not allowed to use ESS at all, while PEQ-15 can be used on a low setting.”
Representative Hunter has done us a favor in bringing attention to the issue, but ultimately I think he will find that the FDA oversight requirement is based in law and Congress will have to change it.
There is, after all, a reason for regulating the use of lasers. We don’t like it when they are directed at our aircraft or at ships. We don’t want to blind people we are attempting to rescue. (Incidentally where is the FDA regulation of lasers in the hands of civilians?)
“Hunter wants to cut that red tape and allow the Coast Guard to certify its own laser systems, like the other military branches…”
That is all very well, but the Coast Guard probably does not have many laser experts who can do that, and we should not trust the word of our contractors. If Representative Hunter wants to introduce a bill to cut some of the read tape, by all means allow the Coast Guard to self certify if they develop the independent expertise to do that, but it would be more immediately useful if there was simply provision for DOD certification of Coast Guard equipment. This should include automatic application of DOD certification to any DOD type Coast Guard equipment used for the purpose for which it was certified.
The Navy has a program call “Navy’s Advanced Low Cost Munition Ordnance” or “ALaMO”
Justification as provided to Congress is here. The proposed budget includes $5.759M in FY2017, $25.984M in FY2018, and $24.982M in FY2019. The round is expected to be operational in 2020 (about the time the first OPC comes out).
“Advanced Low Cost Munition Ordnance (ALaMO) significantly increases 57mm MK 110 Gun Mount lethality and effectiveness against Fast Attack Craft and Fast In-Shore Attack Craft (FAC/FIAC). The 57mm ALaMO funding supports non-recurring engineering, design verification testing, environmental qualification, hazard classification, insensitive munitions and developmental testing. ALaMO will be qualified for USN use at the conclusion of the program.”
“A provision in the bill notes interest in the Navy’s Advanced Low Cost Munition Ordnance (ALaMO), a 57mm guided projectile that could be used on the LCS, and requests information on what it would take to achieve initial operational capability by 2019.”
Sounds like the Coast Guard should have a few of these rounds as well, both for small, fast, highly maneuverable targets, and to target specific areas on larger targets. We had some indication this was coming before.
Once again, the Congressional Research Service’s Ronald O’Rourke has revised his “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress” with the new edition issued April 15. This has got to be a hot topic because previous revisions were issued March 22, January 27, and December 14, 2015. That is four revisions in four months, on average every six weeks, but the latest is only 24 days after the previous edition. I have begun to sense, we may have turned a corner. The tone of the reports has changed over these four months, from, how long will it take us to reach the “Program of Record” (POR), to consideration of, if we should perhaps go beyond the POR.
The NSC, OPC, and FRC programs pose several issues for Congress, including the following:
“whether to fund the acquisition of a 10th NSC in FY2017;
“whether to fund the acquisition of four FRCs in FY2017, as requested, or some other number, such as six, which was the number projected for FY2017 under the Coast Guard’s FY2016 budget submission;
“whether to use annual or multiyear contracting for procuring FRCs;
“whether to use annual or multiyear contracting for procuring OPCs;
“planned procurement quantities for NSCs, OPCS, and FRCs;
“the cost, design, and acquisition strategy for the OPC;
“initial testing of the NSC; and
“rotational crewing of the NSC.”
The latest revision includes three substantial Appendices:
Appendix A. Planned NSC, OPC, and FRC Procurement Quantities (pp 17-22)
Appendix B. Funding Levels in AC&I Account (pp 23-26)
Appendix C. Additional Information on Status and Execution of NSC, OPC, and FRC Programs from March 2016 GAO Report (pp 27-34)
Appendix C is entirely new and appears to have been the reason for the revision.
Appendix A (p. 17-22) is a fairly detailed discussion of the results of the Fleet Mix Study and asks why we so seldom hear that the program of record is not enough to assure the Coast Guard to successfully accomplish its assigned missions.
The Fleet Mix Study was made public in 2012 long after its completion in 2009. It is due for a reexamination and the Commandant has said another will be done. When that happens, we seriously need to look at more than just more of the same assets. We need to look at additional technology, equipment, and weapons that might allow us to accomplish these missions without a major increase in personnel.
Looking at “Table A-3. Force Mixes and Mission Performance Gaps” (document page 18) I would note that if we get to Fleet Mix Analysis Phase 1 (FMA-1, an increase over the POR including 9 Bertholf class NSCs, 32 OPCs and 63 Webber Class FRCs, for a total of 104 vessels), we will have addressed all the “Very High Risk Gaps” found in the Fleet Mix Study that included SAR capability, “Defense Readiness Capacity,” and “Counter Drug capacity.” What will remain are “High” or lower risks in Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) and Living Marine Resources (LMR), and a low to very low risk to the Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (AMIO) mission. This total of more than 40 NSCs and OPCs certainly should not be out of the question, after all the Coast Guard has included over 40 ships larger than a thousand tons for the last several decades.
Still, I would note that, no matter how many ships we have, the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission will always be at risk, unless weapons are available to quickly and reliably stop terrorists’ exploitation of a larger merchant vessel to make an attack. Guns alone are simply not up to the task. I have identified two weapons that might address this threat, (1) equipping our WPCs and possibly WPBs with light weight torpedoes that target a ships propellers or (2) equipping our larger ships with the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) which might allow our larger cutter to effectively support our smaller cutters and respond to an attack, even if the large cutter 200 miles from the targeted port. Either would also make our ships much more capable of making a meaningful contribution to Defense Readiness.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 